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My aim in this paper is to reassess the conceptual–procedural distinction in the light of the 
last twenty years of research, and to consider some possible revisions or extensions. 
Section 1 is a brief introduction. In section 2, I outline the rationale for drawing a conceptual–
procedural distinction of the type proposed in relevance theory (Blakemore 1987, 2002; 
Wilson and Sperber 1993). In section 3, I discuss some current issues and objections, 
looking in particular at whether procedural meaning is properly regarded as semantic, and at 
whether a single item can encode both conceptual and procedural meaning. In section 4, I 
suggest some possible revisions and extensions in the light of recent research on lexical 
pragmatics (Wilson & Carston, 2007; Sperber & Wilson, 2008a). In section 5, I discuss the 
relation between the conceptual–procedural distinction and the ‘massive modularity’ 
hypothesis (Sperber, 2005; Carruthers, 2006), and suggest some further revisions or 
extensions. I conclude that the conceptual–procedural distinction is well founded, and may 
have much more general application than has previously been thought. 
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A fundamental question for linguistic semantics is whether all word meaning is cut to a single 
pattern. Is there some level of analysis at which all words can be seen as encoding the same 
type of meaning: say concepts (Fodor, 1975, 1998), or instructions to fetch concepts 
(Pietroski, 2010), or rules for use in performing felicitous speech acts (Austin, 1962)? If so, 
some other machinery will be needed to explain the contrasting patterns of behaviour that 
have been used to motivate a wide range of traditional semantic or pragmatic distinctions: 
between describing and indicating, truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional content, 
grammaticalised and lexicalised meaning, saying and conventionally implicating, asserting 
and presupposing, propositional content and illocutionary force, character and content, and 
so on. On the other hand, the idea that there is more than a single type of encoded meaning 
– as in the relevance-theoretic proposal that some words encode concepts and others 
encode procedures (Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 1993) – might help to 
explain the contrasting patterns of behaviour underlying at least some of these distinctions. 
 
To take just one illustration, an interesting series of recent cross-linguistic studies suggests 
that the acquisition and comprehension of linguistic indicators of epistemic modality or 
evidentiality may pattern differently depending on whether they are grammaticalised or 
lexicalised. According to Matsui, Yamamoto and McCagg (2006), for instance, three-year-old 
Japanese children understand the grammaticalised sentence particles yo and kana, which 
indicate the speaker’s relative certainty or uncertainty about the truth of her assertion, a year 
earlier than English children understand the corresponding lexicalised expressions I think, or 
I know. Similarly, a study of Japanese and German children by Matsui, Rakoczy, Miura and 
Tomasello, (2009) suggests that the grammaticalised (un)certainty particles yo and kana 
may be processed differently from the corresponding lexicalised adverbials in German. 
Comparable results have been found in studies of grammaticalised vs. lexicalised evidential 
expressions, which encode information not about the speaker’s degree of commitment to her 
assertion, but about the type of evidence she has for it (Aikhenvald, 2004; Papafragou, Li, 
Choi & Han, 2007; Fitneva & Matsui, 2009).1  
 
Matsui and Miura (2009) note that these differences in the behaviour of grammaticalised vs. 
lexicalised expressions may be connected to the relevance-theoretic distinction between 
conceptual and procedural meaning. On the relevance-theoretic approach, lexicalised 
expressions such as verbs and adverbs are seen as encoding concepts, constituents of a 
conceptual representation system, or ‘language of thought’, whereas grammaticalised 
sentence or discourse particles are seen as encoding procedural meaning which contributes 
to the computational rather than the representational side of comprehension. As Matsui and 
Miura point out, although the notion of conceptual meaning is quite well understood, little is 
known about how procedural meaning is acquired, or about the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in processing it. However, a fuller understanding of the conceptual–procedural 
distinction, and of the nature of procedural meaning itself, might help to explain subtle 
differences in the acquisition and processing of lexicalised vs. grammaticalised indicators of 
epistemic modality or evidentiality. 
 
My aim in this paper is to show how a conceptual–procedural distinction of the type drawn in 
relevance theory can indeed play a role in such explanations. The paper is organised as 
follows. In section 2, I outline the rationale for the distinction as set out in Blakemore (1987, 
2002) and Wilson & Sperber (1993). In section 3, I consider some current issues and 
objections, looking in particular at whether procedural meaning can be properly described as 
semantic, and at whether a single word can encode both conceptual and procedural 
meaning. In section 4, I suggest some possible revisions or extensions in the light of recent 
research on lexical pragmatics (e.g. Wilson & Carston, 2007; Sperber & Wilson, 2008a). In 
section 5, I discuss the relation between the conceptual–procedural distinction and the 
‘massive modularity’ hypothesis (Sperber, 2005; Carruthers, 2006). I conclude that the 
conceptual–procedural distinction is well founded, and may have much more general 
application than has previously been thought. 
 
2. Rationale for the conceptual–procedural distinction 
 
The conceptual–procedural distinction was introduced into relevance theory by Diane 
Blakemore (1987) to account for differences between regular ‘content’ words such as dog, 
red, think or know, on the one hand, and discourse connectives such as but, so, also, and 
after all, on the other. ‘Content’ words are standardly seen as encoding concepts, 
constituents of a conceptual representation system or ‘language of thought’ (Fodor, 1975, 
1998; Sperber & Wilson, 1995: chapter 2), which contribute to the proposition expressed by 
an utterance and make a difference to the conditions under which it is true. It is also widely 
accepted that discourse connectives make no difference to the truth conditions of 
utterances, and cannot therefore be seen as encoding concepts (though see Bach, 1999; 
Potts, 2005 for a contrary view). Still, discourse connectives have arbitrary linguistic 
meanings which have to be acquired in the course of learning a language, and which 
therefore belong on the semantic side of the semantics–pragmatics distinction. Blakemore 
                                                          
1
 Although epistemic modals and evidentials have sometimes been grouped together under the 
general heading of modality (Palmer 1986), they are now more often seen as having distinct 
communicative functions: epistemic modals convey information about the speaker’s propositional 
attitude (e.g. the strength of her belief in, certainty about or commitment to the truth of her assertion), 
whereas evidentials indicate not the speaker’s degree of commitment to her assertion but the type of 
evidence she has for it (e.g. visual; non-visual but directly perceived; inferred from perceptual clues; 
assumed; acquired via testimony, etc.). 
(1987) made an original proposal about how this non-truth-conditional meaning might be 
analysed. 
 
Blakemore’s proposal was that the function of discourse connectives such as but, so, after 
all, etc. is to guide the inferential comprehension process by imposing procedural constraints 
on the construction of intended contexts and cognitive effects. In (1a), for instance, the 
discourse connective so may be seen as indicating that what follows it is a contextual 
implication of the fact that it is raining; in (1b), after all may be seen as indicating that what 
follows it is intended to strengthen the preceding claim that the grass is wet; and in (1c), but 
may be seen as indicating that what follows it provides evidence against a potential 
implication of the preceding claim that it’s raining:  
 
(1) a.  It’s raining, so the grass is wet. 
 b.  The grass is wet. After all, it’s raining. 
 c.  It’s raining, but the grass is not wet. 
 
This approach has been insightfully applied to a wide range of connectives in many 
languages (see e.g. Blass, 1990; Gutt, 1991; Moeschler, Reboul, Luscher & Jayez, 1994; 
Takeuchi, 1998, 2009; Iten, 2005; Hall, 2007; Unger, 2007). 
 
In an initial phase of research, the conceptual–procedural distinction was seen as coinciding 
with the distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning. Regular 
‘content’ words were analysed as encoding concepts, which were seen as contributing to 
what the speaker was asserting, and hence to the truth conditions of utterances in which 
they occur, whereas discourse connectives were seen as contributing only to the derivation 
of implicatures (i.e. intended contexts or cognitive effects), and hence as making no 
contribution to truth-conditional content. However, it soon became clear that the parallelism 
between the conceptual–procedural distinction and the truth-conditional vs. non-truth-
conditional distinction breaks down in several ways (Wilson & Sperber, 1993; Wilson, 1998; 
Blakemore, 2002).  
 
In the first place, illocutionary adverbials such as seriously in (2a), which are standardly 
treated as making no contribution to the truth-conditional content of utterances, have 
synonymous manner-adverbial counterparts which are regular ‘content’ words and contribute 
to the truth conditions of utterances, as in (2b) (Bach & Harnish, 1979):  
 
(2) a. Seriously, Bill is leaving.   
 b. John spoke seriously to Anne. 
 
Wilson and Sperber (1993) argued that both uses of seriously should be seen as encoding 
concepts, but that the concepts encoded by the illocutionary adverbials contribute not to the 
truth-conditional content of utterances, but to their so-called ‘higher-order explicatures’, 
which carry information about the speaker’s propositional or affective attitude or the type of 
speech act she intends to perform. On this account, (2a) expresses the proposition that Bill 
is leaving, and indicates that the speaker is seriously asserting this proposition. Since the 
truth-conditional content of an utterance is generally determined by the proposition it 
expresses, higher-order explicatures make no difference to truth-conditional content. Hence, 
illocutionary adverbials such as seriously in (2a) are both conceptual and non-truth-
conditional.  
 
A second way in which the parallelism between the conceptual–procedural and truth-
conditional vs. non-truth-conditional distinctions breaks down is that some clearly truth-
conditional items, such as the pronouns I and he or the indexicals now and then, are not 
plausibly seen as encoding full-fledged concepts, since their referents vary from context to 
context and have to be pragmatically inferred. Accordingly, Wilson and Sperber (1993) 
proposed that pronouns, like discourse connectives, should be analysed as encoding 
procedural constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension, but that unlike discourse 
connectives, they help the hearer identify what the speaker is asserting (and hence the truth-
conditional content of the utterance) rather than what she is implicating. On this account, the 
pronoun she in (3a) constrains the set of potential referents to those appropriately picked out 
by a feminine pronoun; from these, the hearer is expected to identify the intended referent 
(e.g. Jane Smith in (3b)) based on contextual information and expectations of relevance: 
 
(3) a.  She wrote the paper. 
 b. Jane Smith wrote the paper. 
 
Hence, she is both procedural and truth-conditional. (For procedural approaches to a variety 
of pronouns, indexicals and demonstratives, see e.g. Hedley, 2005, 2007; Powell, 2010; 
Scott, 2010, this volume). 
 
Finally, a wide range of non-truth-conditional items such as mood indicators, sentence and 
discourse particles, interjections and intonation have been analysed as encoding a still 
further type of procedural constraint, this time on the construction of higher-order 
explicatures which carry speech-act, propositional-attitude or affective-attitude information 
(Wilson & Sperber, 1993; Escandell-Vidal, 1998, 2002; Fretheim, 1998; Andersen & 
Fretheim, 2000; Wilson, 2000; Wharton, 2003, 2009; Wilson & Wharton, 2006). For instance, 
the addition of an interrogative particle, question intonation or interrogative word order to the 
utterance in (4) might trigger construction of the higher-order explicature in (5a); use of the 
interjection alas or certain types of affective intonation with the same utterance might trigger 
the higher-order explicature in (5b); and addition of a confident or hesitant intonation pattern 
might trigger the higher-order explicatures in (5c): 
 
(4) Bill was at the party. 
(5) a.  The speaker is asking whether Bill was at the party. 
 b. The speaker is expressing regret that Bill was at the party. 
 c. The speaker is confident / unconfident that Bill was at the party. 
 
Grammaticalised indicators of epistemic modality, such as the Japanese sentence particles 
yo and kana, would also fall into this category, triggering higher-order explicatures of the 
type in (5c). 
 
The account outlined in this section reflects current views of the status of the conceptual–
procedural distinction. According to this account, lexicalised indicators of epistemic modality 
or evidentiality (e.g. certain uses of English may, must, I think, I know, apparently, allegedly) 
encode concepts which – like the adverb seriously in (3) – fall on the conceptual side of the 
conceptual–procedural distinction and contribute either to the basic truth-conditional content 
of an utterance or to its higher-order explicatures (Papafragou, 2000; Ifantidou, 2001). By 
contrast, grammaticalised indicators of epistemic modality or evidentiality (e.g. the Japanese 
(un) certainty particles yo and kana, the interrogative particle ka or the hearsay evidential tte) 
are seen as falling on the procedural side. Like their lexicalised counterparts, they typically 
contribute to utterance interpretation at the level of higher-order explicatures, but they do so 
not by encoding concepts which figure directly in these explicatures, but by imposing 
procedural constraints on their construction. It should follow from this approach that one 
might expect to find quite fine-grained differences among linguistic expressions with similar 
semantic or pragmatic functions, depending on whether they are lexicalised or 
grammaticalised. So the conceptual–procedural distinction might well help to explain subtle 
differences in the acquisition and processing of lexicalised vs. grammaticalised expressions 
such as those outlined in section 1. 
What distinguishes the conceptual–procedural distinction from the traditional semantic or 
pragmatic distinctions mentioned in section 1 is that it carries definite cognitive 
commitments. The claim that a certain expression encodes conceptual or procedural 
meaning has implications for the nature of the cognitive mechanisms involved. In the next 
section, I will look more closely at this point while considering some current issues and 
objections to the way the conceptual–procedural distinction has been drawn. 
 
3. Current issues and objections 
 
3.1 Is procedural information semantic or pragmatic?  
 
In an insightful reflection on the nature of procedural meaning, Anne Bezuidenhout (2004) 
questions whether it can be properly regarded as semantic. In her view,  
 
Something that lies on the procedural side of the procedural/declarative divide is something 
inherently pragmatic that belongs to a performance system, and is distinct from the 
knowledge that is constitutive of a speaker-hearer’s semantic competence. (Bezuidenhout, 
2004: 1) 
 
In considering whether procedural information is properly regarded as semantic, it is 
important to distinguish between what is encoded – say, a concept or a procedure – and the 
nature of the encoding relation itself. According to relevance theory, in natural languages 
such as English and Japanese, the (linguistic) semantics vs. pragmatics distinction coincides 
with the distinction between decoding and inference. To say that a word encodes a certain 
concept or procedure is to say that the linguistic system is linked to the rest of the cognitive 
system in such a way that activating the word will systematically activate the associated 
concept or procedure, and vice versa. It does not follow that the ability to construct and 
manipulate conceptual representations is itself properly linguistic: indeed, it has been argued 
that the evolution, acquisition and use of natural languages depend on a prior capacity for 
thought (Sperber & Origgi, 2010). To that extent, it is quite right to say that neither concepts 
nor procedures are part of semantic competence.  
 
However, what is part of semantic competence is knowing which word goes with which 
concept or procedure. For instance, learning a ‘content’ word such as dog or red, which is 
standardly seen as encoding a concept, involves establishing a link between a new word 
and an available concept. By the same token, acquiring a new discourse connective such as 
but or so, which in relevance theory is standardly seen as encoding a procedure, involves 
establishing a link between a new word and an available procedure. Which word goes with 
which concept or procedure is an arbitrary matter that has to be learned in the course of 
acquiring a language: it cannot be inferentially worked out, and therefore falls on the 
decoding side of the decoding-inference distinction. Thus, although concepts or procedures 
themselves are not part of the linguistic system proper, the relation between a word and the 
concept or procedure it encodes is properly regarded as semantic.  
 
What does this reflection on the nature of the encoding relation imply for the analysis of 
conceptual and procedural meaning? A possible answer is suggested by some remarks in 
Relevance about the different ways in which expressions in a language can be semantically 
interpreted: 
 
… a language is a set of semantically interpreted well-formed formulas. A formula is 
semantically interpreted by being put into systematic correspondence with other objects: 
for example, with the formulas of another language, with states of the user of the 
language, or with possible states of the world. (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 172–3) 
 
Here ‘language’ is intended to cover both natural languages such as English or Japanese 
and the conceptual representation system or ‘language of thought’. A ‘formula’ in a language 
is a constituent of that language (e.g. a word of English or Japanese, or a concept in the 
language of thought). I want to suggest that all three types of semantic correspondence are 
exploited in linguistic communication: 
 
(6) a.  Conceptual expressions in natural language (e.g. dog, think) are 
systematically linked to concepts (e.g. DOG, THINK), which are constituents of 
a language of thought. 
 b.  Procedural expressions in natural language (e.g. but, so) are systematically 
linked to states of language users. 
 c.  Sentences in the language of thought (e.g. DOGS BARK) are systematically 
linked to possible states of the world. 
 
Hypotheses (6a) and (6c) are fairly standard: it is widely assumed that regular ‘content’ 
words get their meanings by encoding concepts, and that thoughts get their content by 
representing possible states of the world. The hypothesis I want to elaborate on is (6b), the 
idea that procedural expressions in a natural language are semantically interpreted by being 
put into systematic correspondence with states of the language user.  
 
Among the possible states of the user of a language will be those in which a certain 
cognitive mechanism or procedure is highly activated. According to the ‘massive modularity’ 
hypothesis (Sperber, 2005; Carruthers, 2006), the human cognitive system comprises a 
large array of domain-specific procedures with distinct developmental trajectories and 
breakdown patterns, which may be more or less highly activated in different circumstances, 
and are likely to alter their level of activation in response to different cues. Although some of 
these procedures are only remotely connected to communication, others – particularly those 
involved in inferential comprehension, social cognition, language production or parsing, etc. 
– play a significant role in linguistic communication. According to hypothesis (6b), the 
function of the procedural expressions in a language is to put the user of the language into a 
state in which some of these domain-specific cognitive procedures are highly activated (and 
hence more likely to be selected by a hearer using the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
heuristic). 
 
A proposal along these lines would help to explain some differences in the behaviour of 
conceptual and procedural expressions that have been noticed in the literature. For instance, 
representations in a Fodorian language of thought are generally seen as accessible to 
consciousness and capable of being reflected on, evaluated and used in general inference. 
If words such as dog or think encode representations of this type, this would help to explain 
why their relation to thoughts appears to be fairly transparent (Wilson & Sperber, 1993: 16). 
By contrast, domain-specific cognitive procedures are generally seen as formulated in a sub-
personal ‘machine language’ distinct from the language of thought, which is relatively 
inaccessible to consciousness and resistant to conceptualisation: thus, we cannot discover 
by introspection the rules of our language, the principles governing inferential 
comprehension, or the processes involved in mental-state attribution. If the function of 
procedural expressions such as but and so is to activate or trigger such procedures, this 
would help to explain why their meanings are relatively inaccessible to consciousness and 
are notoriously hard to pin down in conceptual terms (Wilson & Sperber 1993: 16). 
Moreover, the idea that acquisition of conceptual expressions depends on the availability of 
the associated concepts while acquisition of procedural expressions depends on the 
availability of the associated procedures may well shed light on subtle differences between 
grammaticalised vs. lexicalised expressions such as those noted in section 1. 
 
I have suggested in this sub-section that the function of procedural expressions is to activate 
or trigger domain-specific cognitive procedures which may be exploited in inferential 
communication. Standard relevance-theoretic accounts have taken a rather more restrictive 
view of the type of procedures involved. According to this standard view, the function of 
procedural expressions is to activate procedures whose main function is to help the hearer 
understand an utterance by finding the intended combination of context, explicit content and 
cognitive effects. In the light of the massive modularity hypothesis, it is worth considering 
whether procedural expressions may be used to activate cognitive procedures whose 
primary functions are not intrinsically linked to inferential comprehension. In section 5, I will 
explore the idea that languages typically contain clusters of procedural expression linked to 
procedures or mechanisms from several different domains.  
 
3.2. Must all lexical items be EITHER conceptual OR procedural? 
 
There is a fairly widespread view that the conceptual–procedural distinction is intended to be 
mutually exclusive, so that a single word cannot encode both types of meaning. Thus, Bruce 
Fraser (2006) comments in a recent paper: 
 
In this article I will challenge the claim put forth by relevance theory ... that a linguistic form – 
a morpheme, a lexical item, a syntactic structure, or a stress or intonation contour – must be 
analyzed as having either conceptual meaning or procedural meaning but not both. (Fraser, 
2006: 2) 
 
I know of little textual evidence to support this interpretation of relevance theory. For 
instance, Blakemore (1987) considers the possibility that but encodes both a concept (AND) 
and a procedure, and rejects this analysis on empirical rather than theoretical grounds; this 
suggests that she did not regard conceptual and procedural meaning as mutually exclusive. 
More importantly, the development of the conceptual–procedural distinction was strongly 
influenced by the work of Oswald Ducrot and his colleagues, who were actively pursuing the 
idea that many or most expressions in a language have not only conceptual content but also 
an inferential or argumentative orientation (which in relevance theory would be analysed in 
procedural terms) (cf. Ducrot, 1972, 1980; Anscombre & Ducrot, 1989, 1997). 
 
As evidence for this approach, Ducrot (1972) cites the behaviour of the French equivalents 
of few and a few in utterances like the following: 
 
(7) a. John has few friends: he is a bit of a loner. 
 b. ?John has a few friends: he is a bit of a loner. 
(8) a. ?John has few friends: he is quite gregarious. 
 b. John has a few friends: he is quite gregarious.  
 
Here, few and a few carry similar information about quantity, which must be treated as 
conceptual since it affects the truth conditions of utterances. However, they also seem to 
impose what Ducrot and colleagues call an ‘argumentative orientation’, which accounts for 
the differences in acceptability illustrated in (7) and (8). Describing John as having few 
friends orients the hearer towards the conclusion that he is a bit of a loner, whereas 
describing him as having a few friends orients the hearer in the opposite direction. This 
seems to be a fact about the semantics of few vs. a few, which must be acquired in the 
course of learning the language. Thus, few and a few (and comparable pairs such as little / a 
little, almost / barely and so on) provide some evidence that conceptual and procedural 
meaning should not be seen as mutually exclusive. 
 
Further evidence might come from utterances of the forms in (9a)–(9c), which have 
sometimes been seen as logically equivalent although they play different roles in inference: 
 
(9) a. If P, Q 
 b. Not-P or Q 
 c. Not (P and not-Q) 
 
For instance, Grice (1989: chapter 4) argues that If P, Q is semantically equivalent to 
material implication in propositional calculus, from which it follows that utterances of the 
forms in (9a)–(9c) express identical propositions. However, as Grice points out, a conditional 
such as (9a) is ‘naturally adapted for (looks towards) a possible employment in modus 
ponendo ponens’ (1989: 79), whereas the logically equivalent forms in (9b) or (9c) are not. 
Grice suggests that these differences might be explained on the assumption that the forms 
in (9a)–(9c) are associated with different linguistic ‘pointering’ or ‘bracketing’ devices. A more 
common line of explanation appeals to the speech-act distinction between conditions on use 
(or assertibility) and conditions on truth, and suggests that although (9a)–(9c) are truth-
conditionally equivalent, they differ in the conditions on their assertibility or appropriate use 
(e.g. Jackson, 1987; Recanati, 2004). However, not all expressions that relevance theorists 
treat as procedural have an obvious analysis in speech-act terms, and the distinction 
between conditions on truth and conditions on use runs the risk of becoming trivial or non-
explanatory when removed from the speech-act framework. Although it is clear why certain 
acts have felicity conditions (e.g. only someone with the appropriate authority can give an 
order, perform a baptism, and so on), it is not obvious that expressions such as it and that, 
or even and also, have felicity conditions in any interesting sense. On the other hand, the 
claim that procedural expressions activate different types of cognitive procedure should have 
some implications for the conditions on their appropriate use. Thus, some of the similarities 
and differences among (9a)–(9c) might well be explained on the assumption that they 
encode both conceptual and procedural meaning. 
 
I have tried to show in this sub-section that conceptual and procedural meaning should not 
be treated as mutually exclusive. In the next section, I will consider how this idea might be 
developed in the light of recent research on lexical pragmatics. In section 5, I will return to 
the notion of argumentative orientation and its relation to procedural meaning. 
 
4. Lexical pragmatics and the conceptual–procedural distinction 
 
Relevance theorists have been exploring the idea that lexical comprehension typically 
involves the construction of an ‘ad hoc concept’, or occasion-specific sense, which may be 
narrower (more specific) or broader (more general) than the encoded concept (e.g. Carston, 
1997, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1998, 2008a; Wilson & Sperber, 2002; Wilson & Carston, 
2006, 2007). On this approach, the speaker of (10a) is seen as communicating not the 
encoded concept MONEY, whose denotation includes any amount of money, however small, 
but the narrower ad hoc concept MONEY*, whose denotation includes only amounts of money 
big enough to allow someone to pay for dinner; similarly, the speaker of (10b) is seen as 
communicating not the encoded concept EMPTY, whose denotation includes wine bottles 
entirely lacking in content, but the broader ad hoc concept EMPTY*, whose denotation 
includes not only wine bottles that are strictly speaking EMPTY, but also those that are close 
enough to EMPTY to justify ordering more wine: 
 
(10) a. John can pay for dinner. He has money. 
 b. We need some more wine. The bottle is empty. 
 
In developing this approach, relevance theorists explicitly distance themselves from the 
‘literal first’ hypothesis, according to which the encoded (‘literal’) meaning is the first to be 
tested, and is abandoned only if it fails to satisfy expectations of relevance. (For 
experimental evidence against the ‘literal first’ hypothesis, see e.g. Gibbs, 1994). Their 
ground for rejecting this hypothesis is that words are merely ‘pointers to’ or ‘pieces of 
evidence about’ the speaker’s meaning. As Sperber and Wilson (1998) put it, 
 
Quite generally, the occurrence of a word in an utterance provides a piece of evidence, a 
pointer to a concept involved in the speaker's meaning. It may so happen that the intended 
concept is the very one encoded by the word, which is therefore used in its strictly literal 
sense. However, we would argue that this is no more than a possibility, not a preferred or 
default interpretation. (Sperber & Wilson, 1998: 196) 
 
This idea fits well with the basic claim of relevance theory that the function of the linguistic 
meaning of an utterance is not to encode the speaker’s meaning but to provide evidence of it 
(Wilson & Sperber, forthcoming). However, the suggestion that words are ‘pointers to’, or 
‘pieces of evidence about’, the speaker’s meaning might be worked out in several different 
ways, and is in need of some clarification. 
 
One way of justifying the rejection of the ‘literal first’ hypothesis would be to show that words 
typically encode not full concepts but schematic concepts, or ‘pro-concepts’. A full concept is 
semantically complete, and can figure directly as a constituent of thoughts. By contrast, a 
schematic concept, or ‘pro-concept’, is semantically incomplete and has to be further fleshed 
out in order to act as a constituent of thoughts. For instance, the word my, in the phrase my 
N, is plausibly seen as encoding a pro-concept which indicates that the speaker (or more 
generally the referent of my) stands in a certain relation to the referent of N, but leaves the 
hearer to infer exactly what that relation is. Gradable adjectives such as tall and short, near 
and far, expensive and cheap are also standardly treated as semantically incomplete. 
According to Christopher Kennedy (2007), for instance, positive gradable adjectives (e.g. 
expensive) have been fruitfully analysed as involving 
 
a relation between the degree to which an object possesses some gradable concept 
measured by the predicate and a context dependent STANDARD OF COMPARISON based on 
this concept. For example, expensive, on this view, denotes the property of having a degree 
of cost that is at least as great as some standard of comparison of cost, where the value of 
the standard is not part of the lexical meaning of expensive, but is rather determined ‘on the 
fly’. (Kennedy 2007: 3) 
 
While the assumption that some words encode pro-concepts is quite plausible, the idea that 
all of them do is unlikely on its own to justify the claim that words are merely ‘pointers to’ or 
‘pieces of evidence about’ the speaker’s meaning. For one thing, it should be an empirical 
question for semantics which words encode full concepts and which do not. For another, 
words that are plausibly seen as encoding pro-concepts are regularly broadened and 
narrowed in ways that go beyond merely saturating a parameter by supplying a missing 
argument – metaphorical uses of cheap and expensive (as in To a martyr, life is cheap, or 
That was an expensive mistake) are good examples. Moreover, words such as Hoover or 
Kleenex, which clearly start out encoding full concepts with determinate, legally definable 
denotations, also undergo historical processes of broadening or category extension (cf. 
Wilson & Carston, 2007; Sperber & Wilson, 2008). This suggests that lexical narrowing and 
broadening apply independently of whether a word encodes a full concept or a pro-concept. 
As Sperber and Wilson (1998) put it, 
 
We believe that pro-concepts are quite common, but the argument of this chapter does not 
depend on that assumption (or even on the existence of pro-concepts). What we will argue is 
that, quite commonly, all words behave as if they encoded pro-concepts: that is, whether or 
not a word encodes a full concept, the concept it is used to convey in a given utterance has 
to be contextually worked out. (Sperber & Wilson, 1998: 185) 
 
So relevance theorists reject the ‘literal first’ hypothesis on the ground that words are merely 
‘pointers to’ or ‘pieces of evidence about’ a concept involved in the speaker’s meaning, or (to 
echo another frequent comment) that the concept encoded by a word is activated during 
comprehension, but not necessarily deployed. According to the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristic, a hearer interpreting an utterance should follow a path of least 
effort in looking for implications (or other cognitive effects), testing possible interpretations in 
order of accessibility and stopping when he has enough effects to satisfy his expectations of 
relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Which raises the following question: Why should a 
hearer using the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic not simply test the encoded 
(‘literal’) meaning first? What could be easier than plugging the encoded concept2 into the 
proposition expressed, and adjusting it only if the resulting interpretation fails to satisfy 
expectations of relevance? In other words, what  is there to prevent the encoded concept 
being not only activated, but also deployed? 
 
A possible revision to the theory envisaged by Dan Sperber in a discussion on the relevance 
e-mail list (Relevance e-mail Archives, 3.12.2007) might go some way towards answering 
these questions. Responding to Ducrot’s proposal that all words should be seen as having at 
least some procedural content, Sperber remarks that it ‘would not be inconsistent’ for 
relevance theorists to accept this proposal, or at least to adapt it along the following lines: 
 
(11) a.  Assume that all lexical items encode procedures (whether or not they also 
encode conceptual content, as most of them do). 
b.  When a conceptual content is encoded, so is an instruction to inferentially 
construct an ad hoc concept using the encoded conceptual content as a 
starting point. 
c. Other instructions of the type familiar from Diane Blakemore’s work may be 
encoded by any word, whether or not it also encodes conceptual content. 
 
On this approach, most words would encode some procedural content. Some would also 
encode conceptual content, whereas others (e.g. however) would not. Among words with 
both procedural and conceptual content, some (e.g. giraffe) would automatically trigger a 
procedure for constructing an ad hoc concept on the basis of the encoded concept,3 
whereas others (e.g. unless) might encode a more specific procedure of the type familiar 
from Blakemore’s work. Sperber adds that he does not have a clear view of the merits of this 
proposal, and is not advocating it, but merely recommends it as worth thinking about. 
 
It seems to me that a revision along these lines might have several advantages. On the 
theoretical side, it would explain why utterance interpretation does not proceed according to 
the ‘literal first’ hypothesis, and why the encoded concept is activated during lexical 
comprehension, but not necessarily deployed. It would also make sense of the claim that the 
occurrence of a word in an utterance is a ‘pointer to’, or a ‘piece of evidence about’, the 
speaker’s meaning, and leave it open to empirical investigation which words encode full 
concepts and which do not. 
 
On the descriptive side, the proposed revision would shed some light on historical processes 
such as grammaticalisation, where a lexical item loses some or all of its conceptual content 
and acquires a purely grammatical function (Traugott & Heine, 1991; Hopper & Traugott, 
2003; Wharton, 2009). In the current framework, where much of the conceptual vocabulary 
is seen as entirely lacking procedural content, the historical process by which (say) a verb 
becomes a complementiser must be analysed as involving a switch at some point from 
conceptual to procedural status. The framework offers no obvious way of explaining why 
such a switch should take place, or why it systematically goes in one direction (i.e. from 
conceptual to procedural) rather than the other. In the revised framework, where all ‘content’ 
                                                          
2
 Or, more precisely, the conceptual address of the encoded concept (see Sperber & Wilson 1995: 
85–86). 
3
 Recall that on the account proposed in section 3.1, procedures themselves are not part of the 
meaning of a word, but are merely activated or triggered by the occurrence of that word in an 
utterance. When a procedure is triggered by a general class of items (e.g. regular ‘content’ words), 
the triggering mechanism would presumably be formulated at the level of the class rather than the 
individual word, so that new items added to the class would automatically trigger the procedure. 
words would start out with at least some procedural content, it is easy to see how this 
procedural content might become more specific over time, to a point where the original 
conceptual content becomes entirely redundant.  
 
Ducrot’s examples (e.g. few / a few, little / a little, barely / almost) would fit naturally into this 
framework, as intermediate cases with the same conceptual content but different procedural 
orientations. Sperber and Wilson (2008b) suggest a similar approach to gradable adjectives, 
on which X is tall and X is short encode the same rather minimal conceptual content (i.e. that 
X has some value on the height scale), but differ in procedural orientation. This approach fits 
well with Grice’s suggestion that many of the intuitions that semantic accounts are designed 
to explain could be better handled by combining a simpler semantics with a well-developed 
pragmatics. 
 
I have tried to show in this section that the assumption that some items encode both 
conceptual and procedural meaning has definite advantages for lexical pragmatics. I have 
also tentatively suggested that the assumption that all conceptual items encode procedural 
meaning might bring further advantages, and is worth investigating further. In the next 
section, I will look more closely at the relation between argumentative orientation and 
procedural meaning, and discuss some further possible revisions or extensions. 
 
5. Massive modularity and the conceptual--procedural distinction 
 
5.1 Varieties of procedural meaning 
 
A massively modular mind is characterised by a wide array of special-purpose cognitive 
mechanisms or modules adapted to regularities in different domains (e.g. naïve physics, 
naïve biology, naïve mathematics, etc.). I suggested in section 3 that the function of the 
procedural expressions in a language may be to activate such domain-specific procedures. 
In principle, these could be of any type at all, although in practice they are likely to be drawn 
from modules which play a significant role in linguistic communication: these include the 
modules (or sub-modules) involved in mindreading (Baron-Cohen, 1995), emotion reading 
(Wharton, 2003, 2009), social cognition (Malle, 2004; Fiske & Taylor, 2008), parsing and 
speech production (Levelt, 1993), inferential comprehension (Sperber & Wilson, 2002), and 
so on. One consequence of this suggestion is that we might expect to find clusters of 
procedural items linked to different domain-specific capacities. And indeed, this seems to be 
just what we find. 
 
For instance, most languages have a cluster of procedural items (e.g. affective intonation, 
interjections such as wow!, attitudinal particles such as alas!) associated with procedures for 
emotion reading. The capacity to read emotions from facial and vocal cues is known to be 
present very early, and its outputs are particularly hard to analyse in conceptual terms 
(Wharton, 2003, 2009). Expressions of this type are therefore particularly suitable for 
procedural treatment. Most languages also have a cluster of procedural items (e.g. mood 
indicators, which may be realised by grammaticalised particles or morphemes, by word order 
or simply by intonation) associated with procedures for attributing mental states such as 
beliefs, desires or intentions on the basis of behavioural cues. A naïve capacity for 
mindreading is also thought to be present very early, although its outputs may not be 
available to introspection or general inference until much later (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007; Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2010). Languages with 
grammaticalised honorific systems contain a further cluster of procedural expressions which 
might be seen as linked to the capacity for social cognition. Notice that the capacities for 
mindreading, emotion reading and social cognition are not intrinsically linked to ostensive 
communication: for instance, we attribute mental states to others whether or not they are 
communicating with us (although speakers frequently exploit these capacities in conveying 
their intended meanings) (Wilson & Wharton, 2006).  
 
Most languages also have a cluster of procedural items (e.g. punctuation, prosody and 
various types of discourse particle) which are indeed intrinsically linked to communication, 
and whose function is guide the comprehension process in one direction or another. For 
instance, the presence of a comma in the written version of (12), or of ‘comma intonation’ in 
the spoken version, would encourage disambiguation as in (13a) rather than (13b): 
 
(12) Sue didn’t sign the petition(,) because Mary did. 
(13) a. Because Mary signed the petition, Sue didn’t sign it. 
 b. It was not because Mary signed the petition that Sue signed it. 
 
As noted in section 2, the standard relevance-theoretic account of procedural meaning treats 
discourse connectives such as but, so and after all as guiding the comprehension process 
by constraining the construction of contexts and/or the derivation of cognitive effects. I will 
argue, following Sperber (2001), that logical and discourse connectives may have more to 
do with a capacity for argumentation and persuasion than with inferential comprehension 
itself. In the next sub-section, I will look briefly at the speaker’s capacity for argumentation 
and persuasion and the hearer’s capacity to protect himself from mistakes or deliberate 
deception by the speaker. In section 5.3, I will consider how logical and discourse 
connectives, on the one hand, and linguistic indicators of epistemic modality or evidentiality, 
on the other, might be reanalysed from this perspective.  
 
5.2 Understanding and believing 
 
A speaker producing an utterance has two distinct goals: to get the hearer to understand her 
meaning, and to persuade him to believe it. The hearer has two corresponding tasks: to 
understand the speaker’s meaning, and to decide whether to believe it. The first task 
involves the pragmatic ability to infer the speaker’s meaning from linguistic and contextual 
cues. The second involves what Sperber et al. (2010) call a capacity for ‘epistemic vigilance’ 
which enables hearers to avoid being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. 
 
Understanding an utterance is clearly a prerequisite to believing it. What further cognitive 
mechanisms are involved in the move from understanding to believing? In recent work, 
Sperber et al. (2010) survey a range of experimental results which suggest that epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms fall into two broad groups: there are procedures for assessing the 
reliability of the source of communicated information (i.e. deciding who to believe) and 
procedures for assessing the reliability of its content (i.e. deciding what to believe). I will 
suggest that linguistic indicators of epistemic modality and evidentiality are linked to the first 
type of mechanism, and logical and discourse connectives to the second. 
 
A reliable speaker must meet two conditions: she must be competent, and she must be 
benevolent. In other words, she must possess genuine information (as opposed to 
misinformation or no information), and she must intend to share that information with her 
hearer (rather than making assertions that she does not regard as true, whether mistakenly 
or in an attempt to deceive). There is a growing body of research which suggests that even 
at a very early age, children do not treat all communicated information as equally reliable (for 
reviews, see Koenig & Harris, 2007; Heyman, 2008). At 16 months, they notice when a 
familiar word is inappropriately used. By the age of two, they often attempt to contradict and 
correct assertions that they believe to be false.  Given the choice, three-year-olds seem to 
prefer informants who are both benevolent and competent (e.g. Mascaro & Sperber, 2009; 
Clément, Koenig & Harris, 2004). In preferring benevolent informants, they take into account 
not only their own observations but also what they have been told about the informant’s 
moral character, and in preferring competent informants, they take past accuracy into 
account. By the age of four, children not only have appropriate preferences for reliable 
informants, but also show some grasp of what this reliability involves: for instance, they can 
predict that a dishonest informant will provide false information, or that an incompetent 
informant will be less reliable. Moreover, they make such predictions despite the fact that 
unreliable informants typically present themselves as benevolent and competent. 
 
Children also have some capacity to compare the reliability of different sources of 
information. In a recent series of experiments, a majority of three-year-olds trusted their own 
perceptions in preference to a series of consistently false judgments made by confederates 
of the experimenters (Corriveau & Harris, in press). They can also take account of an 
informant’s access to information (Robinson, Haigh & Nurmsoo, 2008; Nurmsoo & Robinson, 
2009). They attribute to others lasting dispositions for greater or lesser reliability, and may do 
so on the basis of an understanding that different people are more or less knowledgeable 
(Koenig & Harris, 2007; Corriveau & Harris, 2009). Children’s epistemic vigilance thus draws 
on – and provides evidence for – distinct aspects of their naïve epistemology: their 
understanding that people’s access to information, strength of belief, knowledgeability, and 
commitment to assertions come in degrees. 
 
The development of epistemic vigilance targeted at the content of communicated information 
has been less well studied. Although some communicated contents (e.g. tautologies or 
contradictions) are intrinsically believable or unbelievable, in general, the reliability of 
communicated contents has to be assessed in the context of background beliefs which 
provide evidence for or against them. Assessing the content of communication presupposes 
a logical or argumentative capacity: the hearer must have a set of procedures for evaluating 
the internal consistency of the speaker’s assertion and its logical or evidential relations to 
background information which may support or disconfirm it. Sperber et al. (2010) note that 
according to relevance theory, the search for a relevant interpretation, which is part and 
parcel of the comprehension process, automatically involves the making of inferences which 
may turn up inconsistencies or incoherences between the communicated content and 
background information. Some of these inconsistencies or incoherences may be resolved at 
a sub-attentive level (e.g. by the sort of automatic procedure for resolving contradictions 
discussed in Relevance: 114–115), whereas others may involve a conscious decision based 
on higher-order reasoning wholly dedicated to epistemic assessment (cf. Mercier & Sperber, 
2009, 2011). Thus, comprehension, the search for relevance, and epistemic assessment 
may be seen as interconnected aspects of a single overall process whose goal is to make 
the best of communicated information. 
 
I have suggested in this sub-section that there are two broad types of epistemic vigilance 
mechanism: those targeted at the content of communicated information, and those targeted 
at its source. In the next sub-section, I will argue that logical and discourse connectives are 
linked to the first type of epistemic vigilance mechanism, and linguistic indicators of 
epistemic modality or evidentiality to the second. 
 
5.3 Procedural information and epistemic vigilance 
 
As noted above, the speaker’s goal in producing an utterance is not only to be understood, 
but to be believed. I have given some evidence that hearers are equipped with epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms which protect them from being accidentally or intentionally 
misinformed. What resources do speakers have for getting past the hearer’s epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms and convincing him after all? 
 
Suppose I want you to believe a certain proposition, but I realise that it conflicts with some 
background assumption you have in mind. One way to get past your vigilance mechanisms 
would be to produce an argument showing that this proposition follows logically from, or is 
strongly supported by, other background information you have available that you would be 
reluctant to give up. Producing an argument of this type would involve the use of logical or 
discourse connectives to display the intended logical or evidential relations. As Sperber 
(2001) puts it, 
 
Displaying [logical/evidential relations] requires an argumentative form, the use of logical 
terms such as if, and, or and unless, and of words indicating inferential relationships such as 
therefore, since, but, and nevertheless. It is generally taken for granted that the logical and 
inferential vocabulary is – and presumably emerged as – a tool for reflection and reasoning. 
From an evolutionary point of view, this is not particularly plausible. The hypothesis that such 
terms emerged as tools for persuasion may be easier to defend. (Sperber, 2001: 410) 
 
This opens up a possible alternative to the standard relevance-theoretic account, on which 
the main function of discourse connectives is to guide the hearer’s path in inferential 
comprehension. On this new account, the main function of discourse connectives would be 
not so much to guide the comprehension process as to trigger argumentative procedures 
which yield intuitions about evidential relations, and form part of the capacity for epistemic 
vigilance directed at the content of communicated information. In the light of recent work on 
the argumentative theory of reasoning (e.g. Mercier & Sperber, 2011), this possibility seems 
well worth exploring further. 
 
Returning to linguistic indicators of epistemic modality and evidentiality such as the particles 
yo, kana and tte in Japanese, I want to suggest that they may also be linked to epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms, this time geared to assessing the reliability, honesty and 
trustworthiness of the speaker. As noted in Sperber et al. (2010), it is in the interest of 
speakers to appear generally reliable, honest and trustworthy. If we regularly interact with 
the same people, giving them false or inaccurate information, even if it is to our own 
immediate advantage, may damage our reputation and end up being costly in the long run. 
Conversely, doing our best to be systematically trustworthy may cost us some extra effort in 
the short term, but may be beneficial in the long run. The trade-off between the short term 
costs and long term benefits of a policy of trustworthiness may vary from person to person, 
so that different speakers may end up following different policies. However, speakers who 
opt for a policy of systematic trustworthiness would stand to benefit from a reputation for 
being highly trustworthy, which would be fed by common knowledge of their past actions, 
and might be advertised by their everyday public behaviour and demeanour. 
 
Suppose, now, that I want you to believe some proposition, but I am not sure you will take 
my word for it in the absence of information about the type of evidence I have available or 
my reliability on that topic. An obvious way to get past your epistemic vigilance mechanisms 
would be to display openly the type of evidence I have, or my degree of confidence in the 
truth of my assertion, by using linguistic indicators of epistemic modality or evidentiality. On 
this account, the function of evidentials and epistemic modals would not be to guide the 
comprehension process (the proposition expressed by the utterance would have been 
understood just as well without them), but to display the communicator’s competence, 
benevolence and trustworthiness to the hearer. 
 
Some support for this suggestion comes from comments by speakers of languages with 
grammaticalised evidential systems in which the use of an appropriate evidential expression 
is obligatory. According to Alexandra Aikhenvald (2004: 336), in languages of this type, 
‘getting one’s evidentials right is important for one’s status and credibility’: 
 
Ignoring evidentiality in a language with evidentials gets you marked as unreliable or a liar. 
(Aikhenvald, 2004: 344) 
 
Accuracy in getting one’s information source right is crucial for successful communication, 
and for the speaker’s reputation. (ibid.: 335) 
 
Or, as Silver and Miller (1997: 37) put it,  
 
In the use of evidentials, the issue is not morality, or truth, it is accuracy.  
 
These comments support the view that evidentials have more to do with getting the audience 
to trust the speaker than with helping them to understand her. 
 
In this section, I have suggested briefly (following Sperber 2001) that the use of (conceptual) 
logical connectives such as and, or and if...then and (procedural) discourse connectives 
such as but, so and after all may be more closely linked to the capacity for epistemic 
vigilance targeted at communicated contents than to pragmatics proper. I have also 
suggested that the use of lexicalised (conceptual) indicators of epistemic modality or 
evidentiality such as English think, know, allegedly or reportedly and their grammaticalised 
(procedural) counterparts such as Japanese yo, kana or tte may be more closely linked to 
the capacity for epistemic vigilance targeted at the source of communicated information than 
to pragmatics proper. Returning to the question raised at the start of the paper, what 
difference does it make to language acquisition or processing that some expressions are 
grammaticalised, whereas others are lexicalised? 
 
 According to my account, it should be possible to acquire a grammaticalised (hence 
procedural) indicator (e.g. a discourse connective, a grammaticalised indicator of epistemic 
modality or evidentiality) on two conditions: first, that the associated procedures are already 
available, and second, that the child can work out which indicators go with which 
procedures. In order to acquire a lexicalised expression with a similar semantic or pragmatic 
function (e.g. logical connectives such as or and if, lexicalised indicators of epistemic 
modality such as certain, sure, allegedly, reportedly), the child must also have access to the 
associated concepts. Moreover, these concepts must be capable of figuring directly in an 
interpretation of the speaker’s meaning at the level of either the basic assertion or a higher-
order explicature, along lines discussed for the adverbial seriously in (2) above. By contrast, 
grammaticalised indicators such as Japanese yo and kana encourage the construction of 
appropriate higher-order explicatures without encoding concepts which figure directly in an 
interpretation of the speaker’s meaning. One way of capturing these differences is to say 
that conceptual expressions describe, whereas procedural expressions indicate. It should 
follow that a conceptual expression may be used to make a secondary assertion with its own 
truth-conditional content and relevance, whereas the information conveyed by a procedural 
expression is generally backgrounded. Thus, the choice of a conceptual as opposed to a 
procedural expression may have important effects not only on the content of an utterance, 
but also on its information structure and style. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
I have tried to show that there is good reason to draw a conceptual–procedural distinction of 
the type proposed in relevance theory, and to clarify what it means to say that some words 
encode conceptual content and others encode procedures. In particular, I have argued that 
just as conceptual expressions correspond systematically to constituents of a language of 
thought, so procedural expressions correspond systematically to cognitive procedures 
formulated in a sub-personal ‘machine language’ distinct from the language of thought. 
 
In developing these suggestions, I have made two main points. The first is that conceptual 
and procedural meaning should not be seen as mutually exclusive, and that there may be 
some advantages to the idea that most or all ‘content’ words also carry procedural meaning. 
The second is that although procedural expressions do indeed guide the comprehension 
process in one direction or another, this is not always their raison d’etre. Some procedural 
expressions appear to be linked to capacities which are not intrinsically linked to 
comprehension, including mindreading, emotion reading, social cognition, parsing and 
epistemic vigilance. On this account, what all procedural expressions have in common is not 
necessarily their cognitive function, but only their triggering role.  
 
I have also suggested that because of its cognitive commitments, the conceptual–procedural 
distinction may help to explain the contrasting patterns of behaviour that have been used to 
motivate a variety of traditional semantic or pragmatic distinctions, including the distinction 
between grammaticalised and lexicalised meaning. There is clearly much more work to be 
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